Introduction and Overview
Julian M. Alston, Philip G. Pardey, and Roley R. Piggott I n the early 21st century, the science of agriculture has started to shift gears, just as it did 100 years ago. At the beginning of the 20th century, Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, the pure-line theory of Wilhelm Johannsen, and the rediscovery of Gregor Mendel's laws of heredity contributed to the rise of plant breeding, while Louis Pasteur's germ theory of disease and the development of vaccines opened up lines of research in the veterinary sciences. The next epoch in agricultural technology will also have fundamental biological science at its foundation. Today, scientists armed with new molecular biologies involving genomics, proteomics, recombinant DNA, and supporting informatics technologies are delving deeper into the genetics of life, with potentially profound and pervasive implications for agriculture worldwide.
The context in which that science will take place has evolved and shifted as well. The public purpose in agricultural R&D is less focused and more closely scrutinized than it was a century ago; the general public seems less trusting of some areas of science, and perhaps of some scientists (National Science Board 2002); and marked changes are taking place in the intellectual property regimes relating to the genetic resources used in agriculture and the technologies used to transform them (Boettiger et al. 2004; Pardey, Koo, and Nottenburg 2004) . Complacency has crept in too. Some question the need for continued public funding at recent levels, suggesting that the world's food problems are being solved or constrained by things other than R&D, or that the private sector will do the job (see Runge et al. 2003) . Others see a scientific apartheid taking shape, with large parts of the developing world being left behind or denied the prospects science has to offer for growth, development, and prosperity (Serageldin 2001) . The world's agricultural economy was transformed remarkably during the 20th century. The agricultural productivity growth that fueled this change was generated primarily by agricultural R&D financed and conducted by a small group of rich countries-especially the United States, but also Japan, Germany, and France. In an increasingly interdependent world, both rich and poor countries have depended on agricultural research conducted in the private and public laboratories of these few countries, even if they have not contributed to financing the activity.
But now the rich-country research agendas are shifting. In particular, they are no longer as interested in simple productivity enhancement. Dietary patterns and other priorities change as incomes increase. Food-security concerns are still pervasive among poor people, predominantly in poor countries. In rich countries we see a declining emphasis on enhancing the production of staple foods and an increasing emphasis on enhancing certain attributes of food (such as growing demand for processed and so-called functional foods) and on food production systems (such as organic farming, humane livestock production systems, localized food sources, and "fair trade" coffee). In addition to growing differences between rich and poor countries in consumer demand for innovation, research agendas may diverge because of differences in producer and processor demands. Farmers in rich countries are demanding high-technology inputs that often are not as relevant for subsistence agriculture (such as precision farming technology or other capital-intensive methods). As well as differences in value-adding processes to serve consumer demands, differences in farm production technologies are emerging to serve the evolving agribusiness demands for farm products with specific attributes for particular food, feed, energy, medical, or industrial applications.
As rich-country research responds to these changing patterns of demand, the emphasis of the science is shifting in ways that could undermine the international spillovers that contributed significant past gains in food production throughout poorer countries. These spillovers are not generally well understood, and their importance is underappreciated (Alston 2002) .
Other aspects of agricultural science policy, and the context in which research is done, are changing as well. In particular, the rise of modern biotechnology and enhanced intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes mean that technologies that were once freely accessible will be less accessible in the future. Moreover, the new technologies may not be as portable as in the past. Biotech companies, which are mostly located in the rich countries-particularly in the United States-emphasize technologies that are applicable at home. These and other factors limit incentives for companies to develop technologies for less-developed countries (Bradford et al. 2004) . Hence some fear that less-developed countries will become technological orphans, abandoned by their former private-and public-sector benefactors in rich countries (see, for example, Pinstrup-Andersen and Cohen 2001).
In Paying for Agricultural Productivity, Alston, Pardey, and Smith (1999) documented the changing institutions and investments in agricultural R&D in a selection of rich countries. 1 In many countries, toward the end of the 20th century public and private roles shifted, and support for public agricultural research slowed, especially for near-market, applied, productivity-enhancing research. Slowergrowing, stagnant, or shrinking public agricultural research funds are increasingly being diverted toward environmental objectives, food quality and safety, and so on. Who, then, will do the research required to generate sustenance for a growing world population when-at least for another century-virtually all population growth will occur in the poorer parts of the world?
The purpose of this volume is to document the changing institutions and investments in agricultural R&D in less-developed countries, in part to form a companion volume to Paying for Agricultural Productivity by providing a more complete global picture of the issues. A more important purpose is to take stock of what is happening in less-developed countries. This task is especially compelling if, as seems likely, these countries will have to become more self-reliant in developing crucial new agricultural technologies.
In Chapter 2 we set the scene for the chapters that follow. We introduce some economic principles for government intervention in agricultural research, along with detailed data on the evolving patterns of agricultural research spending around the world. Chapters 3 through 11 cover nine countries, including the most important among the less-developed countries, in terms of total investment in agricultural R&D. 2 The case-study countries include a reasonable representation of countries from Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Some basic features of the economies of these countries (plus the United States for comparison), are summarized in Table 1 .1, including measures of their overall size, structure, economic policies and performance, and institutional infrastructure; and measures of the key features of their agricultural sectors, such as primary products, agriculture's share of GDP and the workforce, and agroecological attributes.
The chapters document the history and current status of the national agricultural research systems (NARSs) in terms of policies, institutions, investments, and achievements. The case studies cover a geographically dispersed area (South Africa and China, for example) and diverse farming systems (such as Brazil vs. Korea), yet some common themes emerge.
In addition to these country-specific chapters, Chapter 12 addresses the collective multinational effort to provide agricultural R&D through international agricultural research centers, emphasizing the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) system. Chapter 13 presents a synthesis of the main themes and issues from the case studies, and directions for policy change to address these issues.
The Audience
This book has been written primarily for those who make policy and allocate resources for agricultural research and extension, and the policy analysts and development specialists who advise them: specifically, strategic decision makers and their advisers in international agencies, national governments, and public or private agricultural research and extension organizations. These decision makers must gauge 6 ALSTON, PARDEY, AND PIGGOTT The growth in GDP per capita was calculated by taking the average of the difference in natural logs for GDP per capita (in constant the adequacy and appropriateness of research activities for which they are responsible and build the new institutions for R&D that will facilitate sustained growth and development in the decades ahead. The information should also be of interest to students and scholars who seek to know what has happened in agricultural R&D and why, and to understand the consequences in ways that may lead to better-informed policy choices. Understanding the histories of public agricultural research institutions and the forces of change that confront each system, and learning from the changes made to address these external forces, will provide a basis for formulating public agricultural R&D policies that are both politically feasible and economically worthwhile. Beyond these primary audiences, the material in this book should also be accessible and of interest to farmers, food processors, wholesalers, retailers, environmentalists, scientists, and all who have a direct stake in, or are affected by, the agricultural research system, as well as those generally interested in development and development economics.
